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1. Introduction
In 1978, China started to pursue economic reforms and “four modernizations” under the
guidance Deng Xiaoping’s thinking -- “to get rich is glorious” and China should “keep a low profit
and bide its time” in international relations. 1 America’s “normalization with China may have
been the most beneficial to world peace and understanding.” 2 Since then, China has become
the world’s largest homogenous digital market and mobile economy, 3 the second largest capital
importer and exporter, the third largest consumer market, and a critical link in the global value
chains of many multinational enterprises (MNES). China recently overtook the United States
(US) as European Union’s biggest trading partner.
In 2021, President Xi Jinping stated: “We will work to build a new type of international relations
and a human community with a shared future, promote high-quality development of the Belt and
Road Initiative through joint efforts, and use China’s new achievements in development to
provide the world with new opportunities.” 4 China announced that “the United States is not
qualified to talk to China in a condescending manner.” 5 President Biden regards China to be
deadly earnest in trying to displace US global leadership and vowed not to let that happen under
his watch. 6 The Biden administration sought to use “a tax code overhaul to reset the terms of
global commerce” and “catalyzed the global tax debate by proposing a worldwide minimum tax
of at least 15 percent.” 7 Meanwhile, “China stands for safeguarding … the international order
based on international law” 8 but would not follow “what is advocated by a small number of
countries as the so-called rule-based international order.” 9
What are the implications of China’s rise for the US dominance in global tax governance? Will the
signs of “decoupling” or parallel standards in other areas, such as technology (e.g., 5G) and
COVID-19 vaccine appear in tax policy? Will China go along with the US-catalyzed global
minimum tax in Pillar Two and US-modified reallocation of residual profits to market jurisdictions
under Pillar One? 10

This article considers these questions in light of the broader historical and geopolitical context. 11
Section 2 provides an overview of the nature, purpose and legal instruments of international
taxation and highlights the significance of the China versus US relationship for global tax
governance. Sections 3 – 5 discuss the changing roles of China and US in the past 100 years:
the US’s role in creating and expanding the international tax system from 1920s to 1979; China
as a norm-taker and the US as a dominant norm-setter from 1980-2007; and China and the US
in the context of BEPS 1.0 (2013-2015 G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project) and
BEPS 2.0 (Pillar One and Pillar Two to address challenges of digitalization of the economy).
Section 6 speculates about the future by teasing out the areas of convergence and divergence
between two countries. The article notes in conclusion that it is unlikely that decoupling would
occur in international taxation, but it remains uncertain how China’s role would play out in the
next steps of BEPS 2.0 and beyond.
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2. From Inter-Nation Taxation to Global Taxation
2.1 Overview: International Taxation as a Sovereign and Fiscal Matter
The power to levy income taxes rests with national (and sometimes sub-national) governments.
Through income tax laws, governments raise revenue to finance public expenditures (the
“taxing regime”) and to promote economic and social activities through tax incentives that are
akin to “spending” the tax revenue that would otherwise be collected (the “tax expenditure”
regime). As part of fiscal policy, tax policy is a manifestation of a country’s fiscal choices, which
is in turn an expression of a country’s cultural, economic and social welfare conditions and
choices. 12 Each country has autonomy in deciding how much revenue to collect and/or how
much tax expenditure to spend. There is no overarching international law to limit such
autonomy. A country can also decide not to have any income tax, which can be understood as
using the entire tax system as a tax expenditure to attract capital.
In addition to the fiscal functions, corporate income tax, which is the focus of this article, also
backstops progressive personal income tax to achieve distributive justice. Because corporations
are the main type of economic entities in many countries and their conduct directly impact a
country’s economic, social and environmental conditions, corporate tax policies often seek to
regulate or guide corporate behavior for societal purposes. Multinational enterprises (MNEs)
can thus be viewed as “agents” of the state to this extent. How to deal with MNEs’ income lies at
the heart of inter-nation tax relations.

2.2 Main Issues in Inter-nation Tax Relations
Inter-nation tax issues arise when taxpayers or their transactions cross-over the boundaries of
national tax systems. The main issues include: double taxation, distribution of taxing rights
between countries, stateless income, and extent of constraints on national fiscal sovereignty.
Double taxation exists when two tax systems intersect. It can impede cross-border trade and
investment by increasing transaction costs for MNEs, thereby reducing the economic welfare of
both countries. To prevent double taxation, in addition to unilateral measures, countries rely on
bilateral tax treaties to coordinate the application of their tax systems without compromising their
fiscal/tax independence. Even though “models” have been prepared as early as the 19203 by
the League of Nations (the “League”) and used by countries, bilateral tax treaties are not
uniform, reflecting the diverse national fiscal interests. 13
On the matter of taxing rights, however, there is a broad acceptance of the so-called
residence/source paradigm. Under this paradigm, with respect to MNEs, a country is either a
residence country or source country and income is either income from business, income from
investment (e.g., dividend, interest and royalties) or capital gains. The residence country has
exclusive or residual right to tax a resident taxpayer’s income derived in the source country and
has the obligation to provide relief from double taxation through an exemption or foreign tax
credit method. The source country’s taxing right is conditional upon the existence of permanent
establishment in the case of business income and is limited in the case of investment income.
When cross-border flows of income are symmetrical between the two treaty partners, the
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paradigm works well. In other circumstances, the paradigm favors the residence country. The
“revenue losing” source country can be presumed to use the treaty as a “tax expenditure” in
order to create better trade and investment conditions and stimulate economic development.
Stateless income is often the result of tax planning by MNEs that is “inconsequential or nontransformative” 14 in an economic sense but “sanctioned” or “tolerated” by national tax laws. In
other words, the “multinational” nature of taxpayers or income is not matched by any
“multinational” tax system. Therefore, addressing the stateless income issue requires
multilateral efforts, such as BEPS 1.0.
Bilateral tax treaties generally do not encroach upon domestic tax expenditure programs beyond
requiring non-discrimination treatment of taxpayers resident in the other country. Recent
multilateral efforts to address the stateless income issue, by nature, must intersect with the use
of tax expenditures, in the form specific tax preferences or the corporate tax system as a whole
(i.e., a tax haven). The shift from inter-nation tax relations to multilateral relations cannot be
divorced from national fiscal choices and their underlying economic and other strategic national
objectives.

2.3 Shift from Inter-national to Global Tax Governance
Evidence of recent shift towards global tax governance can be found in the 1998 OECD report
on Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue, 15 multilateral efforts in administrative
assistance, 16 exchange of information and common reporting standard, 17 and the multilateral
instrument (MLI) to implement anti-treaty abuse measures in BEPS 1.0; 18 and BEPS 2.0.
Directionally speaking, the shift is moving from collaboration in the administration and protection
of existing tax rights towards agreement on sharing new taxing rights over residual profit (e.g.
under Pillar One) and curtailing national fiscal choices that are perceived to be harmful to other
countries’ interests (e.g., Pillar Two). It is a paradigm shift that would be difficult in the absence
of collaboration between hegemonic powers. In the 1920s, the US and Great Britain could be
credited for creating the existing inter-nation tax system. In the 2020s, will China join the US in
creating a global tax system?

2.4 China and US as Great Powers?
The US has played a pivotal role in shaping international tax norms 19 to advance its interests.
China has adopted international tax norms to serve its interests in achieving economic
transformation and becoming a global power (see section 4). Perhaps not quite an “equal” in
terms of using technical and legal skills to advance tax policy objectives, China is arguably
closer to the US than any other country in terms of global influence.
China and the US share some common interests in tax policy that are dictated by the economic
reality of being the world’s largest capital importing and exporting countries. Both use tax policy
to advance strategic interests. However, on the issue of which country is the tax home of
residual or stateless income, which is the heart of the two pillars, the two countries seem to
have different ideas. The difference may go deeper than fiscal or economic concerns and into
different legal, cultural and other anthropological influences.
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3. 1920-1979: The US as a Norm-Maker
3.1 Foundational Ideas and Framework
The foundation of the modern international tax system was created in a century ago under the
auspices of the League of Nations (the “League”) to resolve conflicts of national income tax laws
when such conflicts became evident after World War I. China was a member of the League but
apparently played no role in developing the League’s work in taxation. The United States was
not a member of the League, even though President Wilson was instrumental in the League’s
establishment. However, American luminaries, such as Edwin R.A. Seligman, T.S. Adams and
M. Carroll were instrumental in the work of the League. The US was invited to attend the final
session of Expert meeting that finalized the model treaties in 1928. 20
The theoretical foundation of international taxation is the doctrine of economic allegiance that is
presented in a 1923 Report 21 by four economists (Bruins, Einaudi, Seligman and Stamp) to the
League. Seligman was the principal author of this report and “mediated successfully between
the extreme positions taken by the representatives from capital importing countries (Italy and
Belgium) and capital exporting countries (the U.K.)”. 22 He was also the intellectual father of the
US international tax system, which had profound impact on other countries, such as Canada. 23
The 1923 Report was the starting point for the League’s technical experts and provided a
framework for their work that led to the publication of the model treaties in 1928. 24 These
models had a lasting impact on double tax treaties as the current OECD Model has many
features that can be traced to the League’s work. Adams, a “founder of the U.S. system of
international taxation” 25 and “the main architect of the FTC [foreign tax credit]” 26 played a role in
developing the League’s 1928 models as U.S. representative to the League, especially in
respect of taxation of business profit and double taxation relief. 27
Carroll was assistant to Adams in 1927 and 1928, but more importantly the author of “the most
important pre-war study of the allocation of income among taxing jurisdictions, as well as a
principal mover behind the main limitation on source taxation in the League models, namely the
permanent establishment”. 28 Carroll could also be considered the promoter of the separate
entity approach in applying the arm’s length principle (ALP). 29
The framework created by the League was about reconciling divergent tax systems. It reflects
the fundamental hegemony for income tax-based systems (notably the US and the Great
Britain). The US comprehensive income tax treaty with Canada in 1942 was considered the
“precursor of most modern tax treaties” 30 and the treaty with the Great Britain in 1945 was the
turning point in the development of tax treaties. 31
The idea of creating a plurilateral tax convention was considered and abandoned by the League
in the early 1930s. Even though such convention was “desirable”, it was not recommended
because “the fiscal systems of the various countries are so fundamentally different that it seems
at present practically impossible to draft a collective convention, unless it were worded in such
general terms as to be of no practical value.” 32
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3.2 Transfer Pricing
American leadership continued after the care-taking function of the international tax regime
shifted to the OECD. During the postwar and “cold war” period, “the United States became a
beacon, or haven, of free enterprise stability, and foreign investors had substantial incentive to
invest in the United States,” and US enterprises “found substantial opportunity for investing in
active business outside the United States.” 33 Unlike European companies that use branches for
foreign business operations, US-based MNEs used subsidiaries and practised vertical and
horizontal integration. 34 The United States became “a substantial importer of “portfolio”
investment capital” and “a great exporter of “direct” investment capital.” 35 There was a shift
towards economic efficiency or neutrality (and in particular, capital export neutrality) and deemphasis of source-based taxation. 36
The United States introduced transfer pricing regulations in 1968 and 1969 that “were a radical
departure from prior practice in a number of respects”, including a determinate hierarchy of
transfer pricing methods (i.e., comparable uncontrolled price or CUP, resale price, and cost-plus
methods), ostensibly consistent with the separate accounting approach, but had “no explicit
antecedents in the League work”. 37 “These new methods, however, created the basis for
concentrating the residual profit in a single component of the enterprise at will” 38 while under the
League’s work in the 1930s and 1940s residual profits “would necessarily, if not automatically,
be assigned to the “parent” enterprise, on the theory that those profits were in some sense
“produced” by central corporate management.” 39
The OECD published its first major work on transfer pricing -- the 1979 Report, Transfer Pricing
and Multinational Enterprise. 40 This report “is largely based on the US 1968 regulations.” 41 “The
US was strongly in the forefront of campaigning for a single global standard to relieve the
pressures of double taxation on US business.” 42

3.3 The Subpart F (Controlled Foreign Corporations) Rules
To improve neutrality and to improve the US balance of payments, which had deteriorated
rapidly as US-based multinationals expanded their operations abroad, Subpart F was
introduced in 1962 to end tax deferral on passive income earned through controlled foreign
corporations (CFC rules). The main architect of the CFC rules was S.S. Surrey.
Surrey, like Adams before him, emphasized the role of the U.S. in achieving international
cooperation in preventing double nontaxation. His major innovations, Subpart F and the
transfer pricing regulations, were copied by other countries and became a new
international baseline through the OECD. 43

4. 1980-2007: China as a Norm-Taker and the US a Reformer
4.1 Overview: Tax Policy Serving National Interests
During the period of 1980-2007, China created an international tax regime by largely borrowing
international tax norms and modifying them to suit China’s needs, such as attracting foreign
investment and exporting Chinese-made products while the Chinese economy underwent a
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transformation from a command model to a “socialist market” model. China did not openly
challenge any international tax norms.
The US continued to lead international tax reforms through primarily reforming its domestic
rules. These domestic reforms found their way into the OECD’s work and other countries’ laws
in the areas of transfer pricing.

4.2 China’s Introduction of Enterprise Income Tax System
Between 1949-1978, China practised a centrally-planned and controlled economy and had no
need for income taxes. 44 Income taxation became necessary when non-state controlled
businesses were allowed to operate under the policy of “getting rich is glorious”. Foreign
investors wanted to know how much tax they must pay before they could predict how much
profit they could make from their Chinese investments. 45 The Individual Income Tax and
Chinese-foreign Joint Venture Enterprise Income Tax were introduced in 1980, and the Foreign
Enterprise Income Tax was introduced in 1981. The two taxes on enterprises became
consolidated into the Foreign Investment Enterprise and Foreign Enterprise Income Tax in
1991. Income taxes were also introduced to apply to domestic enterprises, including stateowned enterprises (SOEs). In 2007, a new and consolidated enterprise income tax (EIT) was
introduced. 46
The national tax administration (currently known as the State Tax Administration) has quasi
legislative powers and issued normative rules in responsive to tax issues arising from rapid
development in business structures, national economic development strategies and
international tax development. China developed an expansive tax treaty network with countries
that export capital to China as well as countries that receive investment from China. 47

4.2.1 Transplanting International Tax Principles
China adopted the residence/source tax paradigm. Enterprises established under Chinese
laws, 48 such as Chinese-foreign joint ventures or wholly foreign-owned enterprises, were
taxable on their worldwide income, while foreign enterprises were taxable on their Chinesesource income. A foreign tax credit mechanism was used to prevent double taxation. Foreign
enterprises receiving distributions of profits (or dividends), interest, rent or royalties from China
were liable to Chinese withholding taxes.
Transfer pricing rules were first piloted in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in 1987,
introduced nationwide in 1988 as an administrative rule, and codified in 1991. 49 The 1991
legislation authorizes the use of four transfer pricing methods (i.e., CUP, resale price, cost plus
and any other reasonable method).

4.2.2 Tax Policy Emphasis of Attracting Foreign Investment
During the 1980s, enterprise income taxes were not introduced to raise revenue or backstop a
progressive personal income tax, but to serve the national strategic interest in attracting foreign
direct investment (FDI). Deng Xiaoping made it clear that China’s four modernizations need
foreign capital, technology and management expertise. 50 A wide range of tax incentives were
available to foreign-invested enterprises to encourage FDI in productive activities, special
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zones, less developed regions, high and new technology and export-oriented businesses.
Withholding taxes were reduced for transfer of proprietary technology to China. 51

4.3 The US Tax Reforms and “Constructive Unilateralism” 52
4.3.1 The 1986 Tax Reform
The US 1986 tax reform 53 significantly lowered tax rates and broadened the tax base by cutting
loopholes with the emphasis on making the US more competitive in attracting investment 54 and
US MNEs more competitive globally. The broader context for the reform include: technological
and economic changes that put pressure on US hegemony and the apparent decline of the US
in the 1970s relative to Japan and Europe, 55 budget deficit and increased mobility of capital,
and Ronald Regan was elected on a tax-cutting platform to “make America Great”. 56
The international aspects of the tax reform continued the trend of reducing US source-based
taxation of foreign investors, such as the portfolio interest exemption, 57 which led to a worldwide trend toward zero rate withholding tax on interest paid to foreign portfolio investors in the
name of attracting mobile capital. 58 Simultaneously, to enhance the competitiveness of US
MNEs, US residence-based taxation was reduced through measures such as narrowing the
scope of the Subpart F rules (e.g., the banking and insurance exceptions) and extending the
‘check the box’ rules to foreign entities. 59
To protect the US tax base, a branch profit tax was introduced in 1986 to remove the tax
advantage of using branches over subsidiaries in the US. Earnings stripping limitations on the
deductibility of interest were introduced in 1989 to address concerns about foreign debtfinanced takeovers of US corporations. Like the earlier FIRPTA (Foreign Investment in Real
Property Tax Act) introduced in 1980, these measures targeted foreign investors in real property
and business activities as opposed to portfolio investors. On the outbound-investment side,
because the foreign tax credit regime allowed US tax to be reduced by foreign taxes paid on
foreign income and whether income was foreign-sourced could be “manipulated”, the 1986 Act
created nine “baskets” of income that were subject to a separate limitation calculation. The
passive income basket was broadened to include, generally, dividends, interest, annuities,
rents, royalties, and gains from the sales of noninventory assets. 60
US taxation of income from intangibles became more assertive. For example, the source rules
were revised in 1986 in respect of the sale of personal property (including intangibles) from the
previous “passage of title” rule to, in essence, the residence of seller rule – income from the sale
of personal property by a US resident is US source income. As a result, sale of intangibles of
US MNEs is US-sourced. The “super royalty” rule 61 of section 482 explicitly targets US
intangibles and was enacted in 1986 to prevent royalty-free transfers of intangibles to entities
located in tax havens. The super royalty rule also serves a different role in that the 1968
regulations were designed to bolster U.S. source taxation 62 while the super royalty rule is more
about protecting US residence taxation on the conviction that income from US corporations’
intangibles belongs to the US tax base.
The 1986 Tax Reform triggered similar tax reforms in US trading partners, including Japan,
European countries, Canada and Australia. 63 At the same time, US international tax rules, such

Li, China’s Rising (America’s Declining) Influence in Global Tax Governance?

as the check the box rules, “led to widespread avoidance of the base company rules by using
“disregarded entities” 64 and arguably enabled US MNEs to avoid taxes in market and production
jurisdictions. This can be seen in the European state-aid cases involving Starbucks, 65 Apple 66
and Amazon, 67 and the “stateless income” phenomenon that helped trigger BEPS 1.0.

4.3.2 1994 Transfer Pricing Regulations
The super royalty rule introduced in the 1986 Tax Reform is ostensibly inconsistent with the
traditional arm’s length standard in the 1968 transfer pricing regulations because it is not based
on uncontrolled comparables. Such comparables rarely exist as intangibles are generally unique
and their monopoly is protected by law. It took almost eight years for the US to finalize new
transfer pricing regulations. 68
The 1994 regulations introduced the “comparable profits method” as an alternative method for
valuing transfers of tangible and intangible property. This new method is based on a comparison
of the operating profit of the taxpayer with that of independent enterprises with similar types of
transactions (or the sector as a whole) under comparable circumstances. It differs from the
traditional pricing methods by emphasizing comparison of “profits” as opposed to “price” and is
thus more result-oriented and less wedded to rigid transactional pricing comparisons. The 1994
regulations also introduced profit split methods (either comparable profit split or residual profit
split). As such, for intangibles, profit will be allocated first to the functions of the parties on the
basis of market comparables, with the residual profit allocated to the party who bore the costs of
developing the intangibles, whether owned by that party or not. In addition, a “best method rule”
was introduced to require use of the method that leads to the most accurate measure of an
arm’s-length result based on the facts in any particular case. The regulations also introduced
tougher penalties and documentation requirements.
The US re-engineering of the transfer pricing regime raised immediate concerns in OECD
countries and created “a material schism between the approach in the US and the prevailing
OECD thinking on the ALP”. 69 There were concerns that the US approach “would unreasonably
skew income to the US.” 70

4.3.3 OECD 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines
The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines reflect the OECD countries’ collective reaction to
the US approach. These guidelines reiterate the importance of the arm’s length principle but
also recognize the reality that highly integrated operations of MNEs make it difficult to always
find a single arm’s length price. The OECD borrowed from the US concepts such as the arm’s
length range and economic substance. It also adopted the US profit split method and modified
the US comparable profit method into the transactional net margin method (TNMM). The OECD
emphasized a “transaction-based” application of these methods as opposed to the US approach
that looks at the profit results of the corporation as a whole or industry sector returns. Further,
the OECD Guidelines do not go as far as the US super royalty rule in considering further profits
and remain “strongly resistant to the use of hindsight”. 71 In anticipation of the increase in
transfer pricing disputes, the OECD guidelines contain detailed materials on ways of resolving
such disputes and mention the possibility of advanced pricing arrangements to prevent
disputes.
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Even though the OECD guidelines borrowed heavily from the US regulations, the transfer
pricing approach started to diverge in the US and other OECD countries. The US approach is
more result-oriented and maybe considered by some as “more advanced”. 72 But, both the
OECD and US rejected the use of formulary apportionment method.

4.3.4 OECD Harmful tax competition (1998) and US Role in Emerging Multilateralism
In 1998, the OECD published its report on Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global
Issue. 73 Unlike the 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines that represented reaction to the US
approach, this report reflects the initiative of the OECD, especially its member countries in
Europe. 74 This initiative aimed at protecting the tax base of capital exporting countries by
targeting preferential tax regimes within OECD member countries as well as tax havens. 75 The
US supported it initially but changed its position with the change of administration from
President Clinton to President Bush. The Bush Administration supported only the aspect on
transparency and the exchange of information. “The U.S. had moved from a champion to a
revisionist critic of the OECD efforts early in the Bush Administration, and the most influential
actors in the OECD and the EU were obliged to adapt as they could.” 76
Nevertheless, the harmful tax competition project signalled a shift from US unilateralism to
international cooperation. It also represented a shift in international tax governance away from
technical experts to international politics 77 and a shift in OECD’s role from coordinating the
prevention of double taxation to reducing tax competition among countries. It may also be the
beginning of the decline of US dominance in international taxation. 78

4.4 China’s 2007 Tax Reform
4.4.1 Moving Closer to International Norms
While the US dominance in international tax reforms may be declining at the turn of the century,
China’s Enterprise Income Tax (EIT) system moved closer to the existing international norms
when the Chinese economy became more connected with the global economy and more
disciplined by market forces. In addition to functioning as a tax expenditure program, the 2007
EIT became a main revenue raiser as it applied to all forms of enterprises, regardless of
ownership.
The 2007 tax reform signals a shift from a system favouring foreign-invested enterprises to one
that addresses the international aspects of all types of enterprises. This shift reflects the facts
that, among others, Chinese-owned enterprises had begun to make outbound investment,
foreign-invested enterprises were competing with Chinese-owned enterprises on the Chinese
market (which, in part, resulted from China’s commitment to further open its market to foreign
companies upon China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001) and the existing
tax incentives for foreign-invested enterprises became less effective in attracting foreign
investment and were open to abuse. 79
Examples of the internationalization of EIT are: the use of terminology that is more aligned with
international tax norms, such as residence, source of income, and effectively connected income;
the redesign of tax incentives to replace “ring-fencing” measures to substantive activity-based
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measures, which could be in response to the Harmful Tax Competition initiative; the introduction
of anti-avoidance rules, such as thin capitalization rules, CFC rules, a general anti-avoidance
rule (GAAR), and transfer pricing rules that are broadly consistent with the 1995 OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines. 80

4.4.2 Protecting China’s interest as a source country
The EIT legislation expands the transfer pricing methods to include TNMM and profit split
methods. It also allows the use of reasonable methods if an enterprise does not provide
information on its related-party transactions or incomplete information. One of the reasonable
methods is based on the reasonable proportion of the related party’s group profit.

4.4.2 Adopting the Worldwide Corporate Tax System in the name of International Norm
As a burgeoning capital-exporting country, China adopted policies of encouraging “going
global”. However, instead of adopting the exemption or territorial system, China opted for
following the “international common practice” 81 in taxing the worldwide income of residents and
preventing double taxation through foreign tax credits. At that time, US was one of few OECD
countries with a worldwide system. 82

5. 2008-present: China as a Norm-Shaker and US a Leader in
Multilateralism
5.1 The Global Financial Crisis as a Game Changer
The 2008/2009 global financial crisis is a game changer in terms of China’s rise as an influencer
in international tax policy. While the US and other OECD countries struggled to manage the
crisis, China began to: implement the new EIT system; strengthen the management of
international taxation and cooperation; encourage Chinese companies to “go out”; and to
maintain China’s national tax interests through more effective anti-abuse measures. 83 By 2008,
China had become the factory of the world, surpassing the US in participation in global
manufacturing 84 and a major market for consumer goods. In 2014-2015 China became a net
exporter of capital.
China became more open and assertive about its concerns with the existing international tax
norms, especially the ALP and residual profits arising from a source country. China also
became more active in global tax governance. “On tax policy, China has been a true global
player. It has been an active participant in the OECD-G20 Base Erosion and Profit-Shifting
(BEPS) Project, initially as a member of the CFA Bureau Plus in the first phase, and now in the
Steering Group of the Inclusive Framework on BEPS.” 85
Meanwhile, the US led a new wave of reforms through introducing, among others, FACTA
(Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act) in 2010, GILTI (s global intangible low-taxed income)
and BEAT (base erosion and anti-abuse tax) in 2017. 86 FACTA led to the global common
reporting standard (CRS) and domestic law changes in Canada 87 and many other countries.
The thinking behind GILTI and BEAT led to Pillar Two. The 2021 proposed changes to GILTI
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and to replace BEAT with SHIELD ((Stopping Harmful Inversions and Ending Low-tax
Developments) also shaped Pillar Two.

5.2 China as a Norm-shaker
5.2.1 The ALP and Residual Profits
China’s norm-shaker role is perhaps the most evident in the area of transfer pricing. China
found it challenging to apply transfer pricing methods sanctioned in the 1995 OECD Transfer
Pricing Guidelines 88 for a lack of uncontrolled comparable transactions. More importantly, the
existing methods do not recognize and allocate profit to Chinese subsidiaries regarding location
specific advantages (LSAs) in the form of location savings and market premiums (particularly in
luxury goods) or intangibles that are developed, enhanced or exploited through activities in
China. The existing methods allocate profits to entities that own or control intangibles or risk in
terms of creating marketing intangibles and development of technology, but not in connection
with the production stage of global value chains (which is located in China). Because Chinese
affiliates of foreign MNEs do not legally own or control intangibles or assume risks, they are not
allocated any residual profits. That result is not fair. 89 In some cases “the assets and the people
should largely dictate where the group’s profits should stay”. 90
To capture residual profits that should “belong to” China because the value-creation activities
are in China, China adopted measures 91 that, in effect, modify the ALP norm. Some notable
measures include: to allow the use of group approach in transfer pricing analysis; to incorporate
LSAs in conducting comparative analysis and applying TNMM and profit split methods; to
consider internal contracts in light of “the capacity to perform the contract, the actual conduct,
and “trustworthiness” of the parties”; 92 to adopt a risk based approach that places sufficient
regard for the fact that there are sizeable assets located in China” and “the majority of the
headcount of” of the business group are based in China; to adopt a broader notion of
intangibles; 93 and a contribution analysis may be more suitable than a transactional or profitsbased approach so that “remuneration to each party involved would be commensurate with its
role and contribution to the value chain in the group.” 94
More generally, to recognize residual profits derived in the source country, “a global formulary
approach should be a realistic and appropriate option” in some cases. 95
“Alternatively, the Chinese tax administration may determine the proper return for the
headquarters, with the Chinese manufacturer earning the residual profits. Another
potential alternative may be to evaluate the Chinese manufacturer on the return on its
assets or capital employed, using the group’s results as a comparable for the Chinese
manufacturer.” 96
The overall thinking is profits of entities participating in an MNE’s global value chain should be
allocated based on the location where value-creation activities are. China is more prepared to
deviate from the international norm. Speaking from a developing country’s perspective, China
maintains that such deviations may serve as best practices for other developing countries. The
overall stance reflects the taxing interests of a capital-importing country. 97
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Excessive outbound base-erosion payments of royalties and service fees are denied of
deductions. Royalties are considered excessive if the intangibles created, enhanced or
developed by Chinese affiliates are not taken into account. A commensurate-with-economicbenefits test is adopted as a benchmark – any royalty payment should reflect the economic
benefits brought about by the underlying intangibles for the entity. 98 Royalty payments that fail
this test will be adjusted for tax deduction purposes, and if the royalty payments result in no
economic benefits, then the entire payment is not deductible. 99 This test also applies to intragroup service fees. 100

5.2.2 Active Role in BEPS 1.0
China seized the opportunity of reforming the international tax norms through BEPS 1.0 101 and
advocating the value creation principle. 102 This principle’s role is most evident in the Actions 810 Report 103 which seeks to align transfer pricing outcomes with the value creation of the MNE
group as opposed to the contractual terms of the transaction in order to reduce the incentive for
MNEs to shift income to “cash boxes” or other centralized entities located in low-tax
jurisdictions. To assist the value-creation analysis and address the information deficiency
challenge facing tax administrations, Action 13 Report 104 introduces a minimum standard on
country-by-country reporting. The 2017 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines reflect the changes
stated in the Action 8-10 Report. In this sense, one can say that China was, in fact, a normshaker in the area of transfer pricing.
China rapidly implemented the main measures in Action 8-10. 105 It also went further in respect
of contribution-based analysis, the commensurate with economic benefits analysis, and the use
of global formulary apportionment. Positioning itself as a large developing country, China
emphasizes allocating residual profits to production and marketing activities.

5.3 The US Transformative Reforms
5.3.1 2017 Tax Reform
While China’s influence appeared to be rising, the US remains a de facto influencer and creator
of new norms. The US was not an enthusiastic participant of BEPS 1.0 and agreed with the
BEPS measures and implemented the minimum standard on country-by-country reporting. It
has not actually changed its domestic transfer pricing regulations. The effect of BEPS 1.0 is to
strengthen anti-abuse rules to protect the tax base of jurisdictions where value-creation
activities take place. US MNEs were the main targets of BEPS 1.0 and would see more of their
profits taxable in source countries and potentially less tax in the US after claiming foreign tax
credits. BEPS 1.0 measures may also encourage US MNEs to locate more economic activities
in low-tax jurisdictions to back up the location of profits in such jurisdictions. Off-shoring
investment and productive activities and loss of tax revenues are thus among the significant
motivations of the 2017 tax reform. 106
The 2017 tax reform is the most significant tax reform since 1986. Unlike the 1986 Tax Reform,
however, the 2017reform brought the US system closer to the international norm by lowering
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the nominal rate and adopting a participation exemption system. To protect the US tax base
regarding residual profits, a new regime was created through the GILTI and BEAT rules. 107

5.3.2 The Intangible (Residual) Income Regime
The GITLI regime sits between tangible income that is eligible for exemption treatment and
passive income that is subject to current taxation under Subpart F at full US tax rate. It subjects
US MNEs’ CFC’s intangible income (defined as profit exceeding a 20% return on tangible
assets) to current US taxation, but at reduced rate 108 and provide relief from double taxation
through a foreign tax credit regime on a worldwide basis. For foreign MNEs, the BEAT regime
functions as a minimum tax on profits derived in the US through limiting deductions for outbound
base-eroding payments, such as royalties and service charges. In effect, the US claims taxing
rights over intangible income as a “home’ jurisdiction or a market or production jurisdiction,
thereby reducing the tax advantages of artificially shifting income to low-tax jurisdictions.
Preliminary evidence shows that profit shifting by US MNEs to foreign jurisdictions fell after
2018. 109
The 2021 proposal would remove the 10% deduction for tangible income and apply the foreign
tax credit on a country-by-country basis instead of a worldwide basis. As such, GILTI becomes
a minimum tax not just on intangible income, but all residual profits of US MNEs. 110 All lowlytaxed foreign income other than subpart F income can fall within the GILTI regime.
The BEAT imposes a minimum tax 111 on “large corporations” (corporations with average annual
gross receipts of at least $500 million over the past three tax years) that make deductible
payments to their foreign related parties above a threshold (3% of overall deductions). To avoid
reducing US tax competitiveness for research and development, the BEAT rules allow the tax to
be reduced by the R&D tax credit.
The SHIELD proposal would broaden the minimum tax by covering any financial reporting
groups whose global annual revenues are more than $500 million and denying deduction for
cost of goods sold to foreign related parties that are subject to a low effective tax rate. The low
effective tax rate would be either the 15% global minimum tax under Pillar 2 or the proposed
21% GILTI rate, depending on which is put in place first.

5.4 The US Leadership in BEPS 2.0
5.4.1 Pivotal Influence
The BEPS 2.0 program was clearly not initiated by the US or represent global efforts to emulate
the US approach. Until April 2021 when the US made significant modifications, the two pillars
did not seem to stand on solid ground. Since then, the modified pillars have received support, in
principle, from the G7, Inclusive Framework and G20 Finance Ministers. The US seems to be
back in the driver’s seat and both pillars help advance US interests.
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5.4.2 Molding Pillar Two in US Image
The GILTI regime is treated as co-existent with Pillar Two’s Income Inclusion Rule (IIR). 112 The
BEAT or SHIELD rule is similar to the undertaxed payment rule (UTPR) in Pillar Two. The
OECD Blueprint on Pillar Two 113 states that the GILTI regime “draws on elements of the BEPS
Action 3 Report” even though the Action 3 Report has no measures of this type. There is no
doubt, however, that the US rules were the basis for the Pillar Two proposals. 114
Regardless of the original inspiration of Pillar Two, the US influence on setting the global
minimum rate to be at least 15% and forging global consensus is evident in 2021. In fact, the
SHIELD regime might just underwrite Pillar Two as base-erosion payments to any low-tax
country without Pillar Two would be denied of tax deduction in the US. This may be similar to
the use of US domestic rules to underwrite the FATCA and CRS regimes.

5.4.2 De-Americanization of Pillar One
The inspiration for Pillar One came from countries that want to have a Digital Services Tax
(DST). Pillar One originally introduces a new nexus and formulary method for allocating residual
profits among market jurisdictions, but only for digital and consumer-facing businesses. US
MNEs were the primary targets. The US was not keen on supporting it and advocated for a safe
harbour exception that was not well received.
The April 2021 US modifications replaced the ring-fencing of digital and consumer-facing
businesses scoping with quantitative criteria (e.g., total revenue threshold, profit margin
threshold) to determine which MNEs are in scope. They also reduced the number of in-scope
MNEs by increasing the threshold for global turnovers. 115
According to US Treasury Yellen, the modified Pillar One “will be largely revenue neutral for the
United States since [the US] will be on both the receiving and giving end of the proposed profit
reallocations.” Pillar One’s impact on US MNEs is thus decreased. It could be said, therefore,
that the modified Pillar One is de-Americanized by including non-US MNEs in scope and
reducing the pillar’s fiscal impact on US.

5.5 China’s Ambivalent Stance in BEPS 2.0
5.5.1 Changing stance from BEPS 1.0
China’s attitude towards BEPS 2.0 appears to be different from that in BEPS 1.0. In BEPS 1.0,
China was one of the key initiators, took credit for advocating the value creation principle, made
numerous submissions to the project, and regarded the project as an historic chance for reform
to advance the interest of developing countries. 116 In contrast, it is unclear if China has made
any submissions to the BEPS 2.0 project. At the time of writing (October 4, 2021), China seems
to support the pillars more out of a sense of responsibility as a player in a multilateral process
than being a believer in the transformative direction of the pillars. 117
There could be several explanations. The China-US relations changed after 2016 when the US
initiated a “trade war” against China and China became more assertive. 118 China apparently
took notice of the US 2017 tax reform and introduced a tax incentive to encourage US MNEs to
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keep their profits in China. 119 More importantly, perhaps, as its outbound investments grow,
China has a growing interest in protecting its MNEs, including digital companies and stateowned enterprises, from double taxation or additional taxes. 120 Examples of this interest are the
creation of BRITACOM (Belt and Road Initiative Tax Administration Cooperation Mechanism) in
2019, 121 increasing use of mutual agreement procedures, 122 and moving away from worldwide
basis taxation of corporate profit. 123
There also seems to be a growing sentiment that China is “becoming a significant country in
the international landscape of taxation ...ready to shoulder the corresponding international
responsibilities.” 124 China appears to want to have a voice in global tax governance in terms
of taxing rights over residual profit. 125 It may be biding its time while trying to figure what
that voice should be and how it should be expressed in technical tax policy terms. There is
a general theme in Chinese commentaries on BEPS 2.0 about the need to better
understand the impact of BEPS 2.0 on China and to figure out what technical changes are
necessary to advance China’s interest. 126

5.5.2 Pillar One: Mixed Reaction
Between the two pillars, Pillar One is currently more aligned with China’s interests in enhancing
the taxing rights of market jurisdictions. 127 China has endeavoured to allocate more profits to
China through innovative application of the ALP (see section 4.4). China also considers global
formulary apportionment to be a better method in certain circumstances. Pillar One effectively
displaces the transfer pricing analysis and allocates 20% of the residual profit under Amount A
to market jurisdictions based on sales and deems a 10% return to marketing and distribution
activities under Amount B. China is expected to gain tax revenue. 128
On the other hand, China is second only to the US in terms of hosting large digital companies
and MNEs: while 64% of the Amount A profits belong to companies headquartered in the US,
10% belong to companies headquartered in China, and less than 2.5% belong to Germany,
France and Japan. 129 As such, China may be a potential “giver” of tax base when more Chinese
MNEs fall within the scope of Pillar One. Very few China-based MNEs under the modified Pillar
One would have significant sales outside China and profits exceeding 10%. As such, the
amount of profits subject to reallocation is expected to be small in the near future. 130 The
assurance that no DSTs will be imposed on sales by Chinese digital companies is also
potentially beneficial to China.
The tax certainty process may present challenges to China in terms of ceding control over
Chinese tax assessment of in-scope MNEs to the multilateral process. China has been reluctant
in adopting tax arbitration. 131

5.5.3 Pillar Two: Worrisome
Pillar Two is worrisome for some Chinese commentators for several reasons. First, it was made
by developed countries for developed countries. 132 Pillar Two was originated from a proposal
from Germany and France and is consistent with the overall policy objectives of the European
Union and the US. The fact that G7 reached an agreement first seems to confirm that. US
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Treasury Secretary Yellen’s statement that the G7’s agreement was a “big win” for the United
States did not escape the Chinese attention. 133
Weakening the effectiveness of Chinese tax incentives is a major concern. 134 For example, a
Chinese affiliate of a US MNE in the qualifying integrated circuit industry may be eligible for a
tax holiday, 135 but the “tax room” vacated by China may be occupied by the US under GILTI or
Pillar Two, thereby neutralizing China’s tax incentive. Pillar Two may also neutralize the effect of
another new Chinese tax incentive to attract MNEs to locate their regional hubs in Hainan Free
Trade Port. 136
Pillar Two will likely weaken the strategic importance of Hong Kong for China. Hong Kong’s lowrate and territorial-based tax regime and treaty network (including one with China that provides
for lower withholding tax rates) make Hong Kong a preferred intermediary jurisdiction for
investments into and out of China. China has liberally allowed Chinese MNEs to set up holding
companies in Hong Kong to raise capital overseas or making investments, including in Belt &
Road jurisdictions. Through the lower withholding taxes on base-erosion payments to Hong
Kong resident entities, China has encouraged foreign MNEs to use Hong Kong as an
intermediary jurisdiction. As such, “the Chinese government should be thought of as invested in
Hong Kong’s low-tax system” 137 and China’s interest would be adversely affected by Pillar Two.
On the other hand, China already has BEAT-like rules through transfer pricing. Pillar Two may
present an opportunity for China to reform its international tax system through switching to the
exemption system, updating the CFC regime and introducing GILTI and SHIELD like rules. In
the long run, the growth of China-based MNEs may bring China’s interest closer to that of the
US and make China assume the perspective of capital-exporting countries.

6. The Future: US Hegemonic-Multilateralism Meeting China’s True
Multilateralism in Global Tax Governance
6.1 Overview
The US leadership in international taxation has historically be one of constructive
unilateralism. 138 The Biden administration shows interest in “building” multilateral cooperation in
international tax” to “bolster American competitiveness”. 139 The US has re-catalysed the BEPS
2.0 process to serve its own interests. For lack of a better term, this new American style is
referred to as “hegemonic multilateralism”. US domestic GILTI and BEAT/SHIELD are deemed
equivalent to Pillar Two. Pillar One’s impact on US domestic law is likely less severe than on
other countries’ laws.
Since becoming a norm-shaker, China has relied on multilateral processes, including the United
Nations, G20, and BEPS Inclusive Framework to voice its views. 140 As a general approach,
President Xi calls for “improving global governance and practicing true multilateralism”. 141 In the
BEPS 2.0 process, China has played the role of a good multilateralist by supporting the
Inclusive Framework’s agreement on the re-catalyzed pillars. As a “responsible major
developing country”, China has called for more respect to sovereignty and a globally fair and
modern international tax system that fosters growth. 142 China has also desired to have “fair and
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clear rules …to allocate profit retrieved from the tax havens.” 143 With respect to BEPS 2.0,
however, it is difficult to gage the actual meaning of “true multilateralism” at the moment of
writing.
Will the Chinese true multilateralism coincide with the American-centric multilateralism? There
are no clear signs that China will implement the two pillars, even if China supports a high-level
agreement in a political or diplomatic sense. As part of China’s overall global strategy and fiscal
policy, implementation of the two pillars involves considerations that are much more than just
amending domestic laws and signing a multilateral tax convention. If the MLI to implement
BEPS 1.0 is of any precedence, China signed, but not yet ratified the convention.
Understanding the areas of converging and diverging interests in the two countries may shed
some light on the path for the future.

6.2 Convergence in Interests
The underlying economic realities may pre-determine the two countries’ tax positions. The two
countries’ economies are intertwined. Because of the significant investment in China by US
MNEs, what is good for the Chinese economy may also be good for the US. 144 As major market
jurisdictions, both stand to gain new taxing rights under Pillar One, although China would gain
more in the near future as more US MNEs would be taxable than Chinese ones. What US may
lose under Pillar One would be more than compensated by revenue gains under Pillar Two as
US MNEs presumably have more income that is not currently taxed at the minimum rate.
Both countries have recently moved closer to the international tax norm by adopting the
territorial system, reflecting the concerns for competitiveness of their MNEs. Meanwhile, both
have taken measures to prevent offshoring-profit. In the area of transfer pricing, both countries
have adopted a more substance-over-form approach, a broad notion of intangibles and
unconventional ways of capturing residual profits (e.g. super royalty rule in the US and
contribution-based or value-creation methods in China).
Presumably, it is in both countries interests to have a coordinated global tax arrangement that
can minimize the transaction costs for MNEs while accommodating the fiscal needs of capitalimporting countries. It is likely not in either country’s interests to have different “regional”
schemes for taxing MNEs that compete on a global basis.

6.3 Divergence in Approach and World View
The general approach to international tax reforms or global tax governance appears to differ
between China and the US. As a hegemonic power and “technical innovator” in taxation, the US
has, until BEPS 2.0, generally practiced unilateralism. Other countries have followed the US
lead out of their own interests in a manner that is presumably similar to what China did in the
1980s and 1990s. As a latecomer, China has been biding its time. It has recently sought to
change the existing norms through multilateralism as an advocate for developing countries. 145
China identifies fairness as a key objective for international tax reform. In other words, the
Chinese approach is not explicitly about China’s own interests, which differs from the America
First approach. China has attempted to “strike a balance between conforming to international
conventions while being able to deal with some unique issues…” 146
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On the core issue of which country can tax MNEs’ residual profit, China appear to have different
views from the US. Through GILTI, the US appear to believe that US MNEs’ residual profit (as
well as lowly-taxed routine profit) belongs to the US. China does not have GILTI-like rules and
has not even enforced its CFC rules as rigorously as the transfer pricing rules. China seems to
think more like a source country or Factory of the World. China emphasizes the contributions by
people and assets to earning residual profit, as opposed to capital and technology that are
embodied by corporate residence. China may prefer to have the residual profit shared by all
participating jurisdictions under a global formulary apportionment method on the ground that all
constituent members of a MNE group, no matter now they are configured legally, contribute to
and share the collective outcome even if their direct contributions are routine.
China is also more guarded about sovereignty. The Century of Humiliation (1839-1949) is often
a reminder of China’s need to be independent and to avoid falling behind the Western
powers. 147 The US has no similar experience. As such, when Pillar Two effectively treats
national corporate tax bases as “fungible” 148 and authorizes the residence country to tax income
that is chosen by another country not to tax, fiscal sovereignty can be a real concern for China.

Conclusions
The US has been the main architect of the current international tax system. It is difficult to find a
basic principle that does not have any American influence. China has bided its time: learning
from “advanced countries” (including the US); modifying international norms for Chinese unique
conditions; and revisiting those norms from the position of a major economic powerhouse in the
context of digitalisation. On the battleground for taxing rights over residual profit, which is what
BEPS 2.0 is about, the two countries do share some common interests, but also have different
approaches and emphases.
In terms of international tax governance, it is easy to see China’s influence rising, but that does
not necessarily mean America’s influence declining. However, it does appear that American
exceptionalism or America-centric multilateralism needs to contend with China’s uniqueness or
true multilateralism. 149 The trajectory is likely more open confrontation. Until 2013, China had
never openly challenged the US leadership role. 150 In BEPS 1.0, China and other countries
relied on the value creation principle to backstop stronger anti-abuse rules to prevent MNEs
(most of which are US-based) from eroding source-countries’ tax base. In BEPS 2.0, China may
acquiesce at first and bide its time for specific counter measures.
What China wants matters. Research seems to suggest, however, that decoupling of
international tax norms is unlikely at the moment or in the near future. China’s collaboration with
OECD continues and the China-led BRITCOM focuses on improving tax administrative
cooperation as opposed to substantive tax policy.
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